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Firms that internationalize relatively late may pursue rapid 
internationalization by entering multiple markets simultaneously to reach 
global scale faster and to capture early mover advantages. These trends run 
counter to the theory of incremental internationalization. With data on Korean 
firms’ early international expansion experiences, we found evidence that a 
rapid international expansion strategy enhances firm performance in 
industries where globalization pressures are high, by firms with less lead-time 
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  2Most international business literature has proposed that firms expand internationally through 
incremental foreign direct investments. Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) showed how 
firms sequentially enter countries according to the psychic distance between these countries 
and their home countries. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) found that firms enter foreign markets 
through exports, later establish sales subsidiaries, and eventually invest in wholly-owned 
manufacturing subsidiaries. Kogut (1983), Chang (1995), and Kogut and Chang (1996) 
demonstrated that firms sequentially enter a foreign market by adding more plants and by 
adding more lines of business over time. The logic behind the incremental approach is that it 
allows firms to gradually learn about foreign markets and incrementally increase 
commitments. By doing so, firms can maximize the benefits of learning and reduce the hazard 
of failure. Because the “incremental expansion” theory is intuitively logical and theoretically 
parsimonious, it has been labeled as axiomatic (Andersen 1993). 
Yet several researchers argue this theory may be incorrect. They point out that it does 
not explain the internationalization of new startups (Oviatt and McDougall, 1997) or the 
phenomena of “born global” firms (Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen and Servais, 1997). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that European firms such as Thomson, Rhône-Poulenc, and 
Accor expanded their U.S. positions by taking a few large steps, rather than taking a lengthy 
and gradual approach (Rosenzweig, 1994). Furthermore, the incremental approach might not be 
applicable to firms from emerging market countries that had to respond to increasing global 
competition, as exemplified by the recent acquisitions of IBM’s PC business and Thomson’s TV 
business by Lenovo and TCL, respectively. In short, the incremental internationalization theory 
might not be applicable to firms that have expanded internationally in recent years. 
Indeed, this theory is limited by its own underlying assumptions. Because it was 
based on the experience of Swedish and Japanese multinationals that internationalized early, 
the theory emphasizes “learning by doing” as the only way to reduce market uncertainty, as 
  3well as the hazard of failure during foreign market entry. It assumes that once firms acquire 
knowledge of foreign markets by investing incrementally, they succeed in those countries. It 
does not consider, however, the “competitive risk” associated with the incremental approach. 
When firms internationalize, they compete not only with local firms but also with other 
multinationals that have already established themselves in those countries. If a firm that 
internationalizes late expands incrementally, it might be able to reduce market uncertainty, but 
still have to face greater competitive risks in those countries. 
As trade and investment barriers fall and real-time communication technologies 
improve, global competition among multinational firms has intensified markedly. Firms that 
can source, develop, manufacture, and sell their products and services worldwide can have 
strong competitive advantages over their less internationalized rivals. Although a firm that 
adopts an incremental approach may reduce its hazard of failure when it enters one market, it 
may expose itself to a greater risk by its inability to attain global scale quickly. Thus, firms 
that internationalize late, such as those from emerging economies, may feel compelled to 
enter multiple markets over a short period in order to build their global operations quickly.  
The appropriateness of the rapid internationalization strategy is also contingent upon 
the competitive pressures a focal firm faces in both its home country and host countries. Some 
firms that may lag their home-country rivals in globalizing may expand rapidly 
internationally to catch up. Other firms may choose target countries strategically, given the 
competitive environments of host countries. For instance, some firms may prefer emerging 
markets rather than established markets in developed countries. By doing so, they often avoid 
competing with well-established multinationals in the latter markets and instead enjoy first-
mover advantages where they enter. For instance, Korea’s Daewoo Motors quickly acquired 
or established manufacturing plants in India, Poland, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and China during 
the early 1990s soon after these markets were opened to outsiders (Park, 1998).  
  4To date, little is known about the soundness of rapid international expansion 
strategies. Most prior work on international expansion has focused on European, Japanese, 
and US firms. It has not explored thoroughly whether the incremental internationalization 
theory is equally applicable to firms that pursued internationalization later. Our study 
addresses this gap by exploring when and where a rapid international expansion strategy 
might generate superior performance.  
To address this gap, we have assembled unique data of a population of Korean firms’ 
foreign direct investments for 1970-1996. During this period, Korea rapidly progressed from 
being less-developed to being a newly industrialized country (NIC). By the mid-1990s, it was 
industrialized and developed. Many observers credit Korean firms’ international market 
orientation for the country’s miraculous growth (Cha, Kim, and Perkins, 1997). Unlike firms 
from established economies that internationalized earlier, Korean firms’ internationalization 
experience has vivid parallels to that of firms from other emerging markets, such as China and 
India, which begin expanding internationally only recently. Since these latter firms have just 
started to internationalize, it may be too early to gauge their success at this endeavor.  
To evaluate the performance of emerging market enterprises’ internationalization 
strategies, the data from our sample go from 1970, when Korean firms made their first foreign 
direct investments, to 1996, when Korea became the 29
th member of the OECD. We also trace 
Korean firms’ international performance up to 2003. We believe the experience Korean firms 
gained while Korea was an emerging economy can provide useful lessons both to other 
emerging market enterprises that are now starting to internationalize and to international 
business scholars, who wish to develop theories that can explain late movers’ 
internationalization strategies. 
 
INCREMENTAL INTERNATIONALIZATION MODEL REVISITED 
  5  Foreign direct investment has long been an important topic in international business 
research.  Beginning with Hymer (1960), scholars have been interested in the factors that lead 
specific firms, rather than countries or industries, to undertake foreign direct investment. 
Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed the positive correlation between foreign 
investment and intangible assets (Caves, 1971; Pugel, 1985; Kogut and Chang, 1991).
1   
  Foreign direct investment has been understood as an incremental process in which 
initial investments affect the nature and timing of subsequent investments. Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) argue that firms should move sequentially from a country of less 
psychic distance to a country of greater psychic distance. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
propose a conceptual framework of the internationalization process in which a firm moves 
from initially exporting to another country to establishing sales and production subsidiaries in 
that country.
2 The firm then increases its commitments as it accumulates knowledge about the 
host markets. Yu (1990) showed that international operations experience, as measured by the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, increases the likelihood of entry. Davidson (1980) 
emphasized the geographic pattern of multinational corporations’ evolution by showing that if 
a firm had invested in a given country, it was more likely to invest further in that country. 
Kogut and Chang (1996) showed that Japanese firms with prior investments in a foreign 
market, especially in export-related distribution facilities, were more likely to invest 
subsequently, given appropriate exchange rates. Kogut (1983) states that foreign direct 
investment decisions are best viewed as part of a series of sequential decisions that determine 
the volume and direction of resource flows among countries. He notes that multinational 
firms often use earnings from foreign operations to invest in another project in the same 
                                                 
1. A contrasting approach views multinational firms as efficient agents for transferring resources, thus minimizing 
transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Magee, 1977; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982, 1991).  
2 Buckley and Casson (1981) presented an analytical model in which firms switch their modes of serving 
foreign markets among export, licensing, and foreign direct investment. In the model, the optimal timing of 
switching depends upon the costs of serving the foreign markets and demand conditions. Similarly, Buckley and 
  6country, or in other foreign subsidiaries.   
  Multinational firms also display a sequential pattern in which they add lines of 
business in a given host country. Many multinationals have multiple businesses, yet their 
foreign subsidiaries often begin in a single line of business and add others over time. In his 
extension of the sequential foreign investment approach to the line of business level, Chang 
(1995) hypothesizes that multinational firms first enter foreign markets in lines of business in 
which they have the greatest competitive advantage over local firms so as to overcome the 
liability of foreignness. As a firm gains experience in the host country--learning about local 
practices, building relations with local suppliers, working with governmental agencies, and 
recruiting local employees--its liability of foreignness diminishes, allowing it to enter lines of 
business for which its competitive advantage over local firms is lower. 
Taken together, the model describes international expansion as a process consisting of 
a series of small steps, whereby firms gradually increase their international involvement. The 
logic behind the incremental approach is that it allows firms to gradually learn about foreign 
markets and incrementally increase commitments to them. By doing so, firms can maximize 
the benefits of learning and reduce the hazard of failure.  
In contrast, some firms may internationalize rapidly by acquiring or establishing their 
foreign subsidiaries over a short time. By definition, firms that internationalize rapidly cannot 
learn from their prior entry experience. Although information on host country markets may be 
accessible from outside these countries, firms that internationalize rapidly may not be able to 
use it well if their absorptive capacity is limited. A firm’s absorptive capacity in acquiring 
foreign market information is largely a function of the firm’s prior related knowledge (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Without a stock of such knowledge, which is history-dependent and a 
by-product of a firm’s routine operations, a firm might not be able to acquire enough 
                                                                                                                                                          
Casson (1996) modeled the choice between joint ventures, licensing agreements, and mergers. In their model, 
  7knowledge to internationalize effectively. Moreover, the existence of time compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) means the quality of knowledge a firm can utilize 
when it internationalizes rapidly may be inferior to that of a firm that accumulated its stock of 
relevant knowledge over a long period of incremental expansion. Vermeulen and Barkema 
(2002) found that the number of international expansions a firm undertook over a given 
period negatively moderated this firm’s increased profits that resulted from 
internationalization. Thus, the conventional wisdom on incremental internationalization 
predicts that a rapid international expansion strategy will lead to poor firm performance. We 
thus propose: 
 
Proposition 1:   A rapid international expansion strategy will lead to poor firm 
performance.  
 
RAPID INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION STRATEGY 
 
Given conventional wisdom, why do firms internationalize rapidly rather than use an 
incremental approach? A possible reason is related to how a firm can reduce its market 
uncertainty, an issue that underlies the theoretical foundation of the incremental model. 
Specifically, this model argues that (1) firms should build up their foreign operations 
gradually to reduce the uncertainty that stems from operating in unfamiliar environments, (2) 
incremental expansion allows firms to take advantage of the knowledge they acquire early to 
reduce market uncertainty later, and (3) learning by doing is probably the only way to gain 
such knowledge. Yet, although insufficient knowledge of foreign markets can be a major 
obstacle to international operations, recent developments such as telecommunication 
technologies and the Internet make it much easier for firms that internationalize late to access 
such knowledge. These firms can also acquire some subtle knowledge of new markets by 
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this choice depends on the pace of technological innovation and the globalization of markets. hiring professional consultancies. Further, they can often access knowledge about foreign 
markets that is experiential or tacit, which can be gained only through direct experience, by 
hiring talented and experienced managers. 
The most critical limitation of the incremental internationalization theory is that it 
focuses only on the benefits, not the costs, of the incremental approach. These costs, 
especially those associated with competitive risks, can be substantial because of the elapsed 
time the incremental approach entails. It is always easier to enjoy the benefits of learning 
from slow, steady, and orderly international expansion. In an increasingly global and 
competitive economy, however, few firms have the luxury of internationalizing 
incrementally. Firms that internationalize late also face competitive resistance from early 
movers, which have entrenched positions in foreign markets. Because the incremental 
internationalization theory was based on the experience of Swedish and Japanese 
multinationals that internationalized early, the incremental model emphasizes “learning by 
doing” as the only way to reduce market uncertainty and thereby highlights the hazard of 
failure during foreign market entry. It assumes that once firms acquire knowledge of foreign 
markets by investing incrementally, they succeed in those countries.  
The performance of rapid internationalization strategies may depend on the 
magnitude of competitive risks. Below, we outline contingencies that may affect the 
performance of firms that pursue rapid international expansion. We examine competitive risks 
generated from general globalization pressures, as well as from home and host-country rivals, 
and explore how these risks may make a rapid internationalization strategy a viable option for 
firms that internationalize relatively late.  
Global competitive pressures 
The success of a rapid international expansion strategy may depend on the 
competitive risks in an industry. The literature on firm internationalization emphasizes the 
  9role of industry characteristics in shaping a firm’s international strategy. Each industry has its 
unique characteristics, which in turn significantly influence the behaviors of firms that 
compete in the industry (Porter 1985).  
With the advent of improved telecommunication technologies, the Internet and the 
increasing scale economies in production and R&D, more industries have become global. 
However, the pressure to globalize varies significantly across industries, depending on the 
magnitude of the competitive advantages of global operations (Kobrin, 1991). For industries 
such as automobiles and microelectronics, being global is mandatory; purely domestic firms 
in those industries have become less competitive. Firms that can globally source, develop, 
manufacture, and sell their products and services may have strong competitive advantages 
over their less internationalized rivals. As firms expand their foreign activities, the industries 
they are in become globalized, which in turn pressures these firms’ competitors to globalize.   
This pressure can be both instrumental and mimetic in nature (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). MNCs with global operations may achieve scale economies that pressure other firms 
to achieve a similar global position. Thus, in a globalizing industry, firms will be more likely 
to undertake FDI in order to secure the benefits of scale economies and remain competitive 
with their rivals. As a consequence, industry-level globalization pressures may significantly 
affect the success of a rapid international expansion strategy. For instance, the automobile 
industry has gone through massive restructuring during the last two decades, leading to 
numerous cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The key driver for such integration was the 
huge scale economies in new product development and manufacturing. Small, domestically 
oriented firms cannot compete with global rivals because they cannot match their rivals’ costs 
and scale. Yet, although a firm that adopts an incremental approach may reduce its hazard of 
failure in internationalization, it may expose itself to greater risk if it does not attain global 
  10scale quickly. Firms that globalize may feel compelled to enter multiple markets over a short 
period in order to build up their global operations quickly.  
Thus, rapid internationalization may be an effective way to offset the competitive 
risks that stem from being a late mover that is compelled to operate globally. Thus,  
Proposition 2:  A rapid internationalization strategy in globalized industries will lead 
to better firm performance. 
 
Home country competitive pressures 
  The performance of a rapid internationalization strategy may also depend on the 
competitive risks that exist among firms from the same home country. The incremental 
internationalization theory holds any competitive rivalry constant, since it has an insular focus 
on a focal firm against market uncertainties in foreign countries. It does not consider whether 
a firm might react to the actual or expected behaviors of its rival firms. Consequently, it excludes 
strategic choice options when it considers the process of firm internationalization (Melin, 1992).  
  The international business literature has long discussed competitive interactions 
among rivals. The bunching pattern of foreign direct investment (i.e., the follow-the-leader 
effect) is often observed among firms in oligopolistic industries (Knickerbocker, 1973). If an 
industry leader establishes a subsidiary in a foreign country where other firms in the same 
industry are not present, its competitors make similar investments soon after to counter the 
competitive threat posed by the new situation.  
This strategic interest in avoiding the competitive risks of falling behind the leader 
can be applicable to all internationalizing firms in a home country, where competitors in the 
same industry are known to benchmark their internationalization against each other closely 
(Guillen, 2003). If one firm internationalizes and its home-country competitors follow it, the 
latter firms must decide how to catch up in order to prevent it from using high profits obtained 
from its international operations during its period of first-mover advantage to invest and 
compete elsewhere, including the home country. If followers expand incrementally, they 
  11might not be able to offset their rivals’ early-mover advantage. Under this circumstance, rapid 
internationalization may be an effective strategy, especially when a focal firm responds 
quickly to its domestic rivals’ internationalization.  
Proposition 3:    A rapid internationalization strategy will lead to better firm 
performance when the lead-time between a firm’s domestic rivals’ 
internationalization and its own is reduced. 
  
Host country competitive pressures 
  The competitive pressures in the host country may also moderate the relationship 
between rapid internationalization strategy and firm performance. The importance and 
magnitude of host-country competitive pressures depends on whether first-mover advantage 
is valuable (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998). First or early movers may incur 
disadvantages, such as high market-development costs, that are not borne by later movers. Yet 
such benefits must be weighed against the costs of delay. When other multinationals have 
already entered a market and built huge entry barriers, a late mover may be hard-pressed to 
compete against them. In contrast, early movers can define the competitive rules in a variety 
of areas (Porter, 1985). Thus, firms may prefer internationalizing rapidly to become early 
movers in those countries so that it can preempt existing or potential competitors.  
The difference in costs associated with internationalizing early or later varies 
significantly, depending on a host country’s competitive risks. In many developed countries, 
multinationals have already built strong footholds, making the competitive environment for 
existing and potential entrants very risky. The cost of delay for expanding into those countries 
is much lower. In contrast, the competitive risk associated with expanding into less-developed 
countries that multinationals have neglected, as well as in many transitional economies that 
have not opened their markets until recently, is much lower. Thus, the costs of being late 
movers are larger in emerging markets or transitional markets than they are in developed 
markets.  
  12Pan, Li, and Tse (1999) expect strong first-mover advantages accrue to firms that 
enter emerging markets since those markets have long been isolated and thus possess many 
potential opportunities and needs. Using Sino-Japanese JVs in China as an example, Isobe, 
Makino, and Montgomery (2000: 478) concluded that “a wait-and-see approach may not 
always be a better strategy in emerging economic regions.” Focusing on the change of FDI 
policies in emerging economies, Beamish and Chung (2005) concluded that the proactive 
pursuit of opportunities in emerging markets can be worthwhile even during times of 
economic crisis. Indeed, Luo and Peng (1998) found first-mover advantages increased over 
time in transitional economies.  
To conclude, rapid internationalization may be an effective strategy when it is 
combined into entries in markets not tapped by other foreign multinationals.  We thus 
propose: 
Proposition 4:    A rapid internationalization strategy will lead to better firm 





The sample for this study consists of Korean firms’ direct investments in 
manufacturing sector since their very first investments in 1970, until 1996. When Korean 
firms invest overseas, they are required by law to report their investments to the government-
owned Import-Export Bank of Korea, which maintains a database on the names of investors, 
dates, amounts, and locations of investing firms’ activity. The Import-Export Bank of Korea 
also keeps track of each investment and maintains a database on exit activity.  While we have 
data on Korean firms’ entries up to 2003, we selected only entries that took place while Korea 
was an emerging economy. Therefore, we selected entries until December 1996, when Korea 
became a member of the OECD, and might be no longer viewed as an emerging economy. We 
  13also, trace Korean firms’ exits out of those pre-1997 entries up to 2003. 
We believe Korean firms’ investments prior to 1997 provide an interesting empirical 
setting for evaluating the performance of the rapid international expansion strategies of 
multinationals from emerging market countries. First, Korea was a very successful emerging 
market, and had rapidly industrialized since the 1960s. Second, compared to U.S., European 
and Japanese multinationals, Korean firms expanded internationally relatively late. As shown 
in Figure 1, Korean firms’ international investments prior to the late 1980s were miniscule. 
Until then, Korean firms relied mainly on exports of locally manufactured products. They 
began investing abroad in the late 1980s when domestic labor disputes intensified and they 
faced tough competition from low-wage countries such as China and Indonesia.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Although the Import-Export Bank of Korea database provides the entire population of 
Korean firms’ foreign direct investments, we focused only on manufacturing investments in 
our sample because manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors require different types of 
experience, knowledge, workers, and other inputs. We dropped cases for which investors were 
individuals rather than firms, cases in which firms owned less than 10%, and cases when the 
firms were non-statutory audited because financial data for them were not available. The 
Korea Information Service, a leading credit rating agency in Korea that is equivalent to 
Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s, provides corporate profiles and financial information on all 
listed companies and unlisted companies with assets worth more than 6 billion won (referred 
to as “statutory audited companies”).  
For 1970-1996, the Import-Export Bank of Korea database lists 1,459 investments in 
the manufacturing sector by 891 firms. Several firms in our sample invested repeatedly during 
our study period. Daewoo Corporation invested 54 times, Samsung Electronics invested 46 
  14times, and LG Electronics invested 32 times, etc. The most popular destinations of Korean 
firms’ foreign direct investment were China (486 cases), USA (176 cases), Indonesia (162 
cases), the Philippines (67 cases) and Vietnam (63 cases), Malaysia (54 cases), and Thailand 
(42 cases). In all, Korean firms invested in 78 countries between 1970 and 1996. Among the 
1,459 entries, 632 were exited by 2003, for a 43% exit rate.   
Measures 
In order to study the international performance of Korean manufacturing firms, we 
collected data on firm-level, subsidiary-level and country-level factors. 
Subsidiary exit as an indicator for international performance 
  It is difficult to gauge the performance of an internationalization strategy because 
there is no proper performance indicator for both the subsidiary and the parent firm levels. In 
most cases, overseas subsidiaries are privately-held, and most parent firms do not disclose 
their financial performance. Moreover, even when financial information is available, 
subsidiary-level financial performance is affected by internal transfer pricing and often does 
not reveal a subsidiary’s true performance. Measuring international performance at the parent 
firm level is also difficult because parent-level performance is affected by many factors other 
than international operations that are difficult to control for. In most cases, firms do not report 
profits from domestic and international operations separately. Under such constraints, firms’ 
international performance might be better indicated by survival/exit of the overseas 
manufacturing subsidiaries, as represented by closing, liquidation, or divestiture.  
Several studies have examined survival/exit from incumbent domestic businesses 
(Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991; Chang, 1996; Sharma and Kesner, 
1996). Sharma and Kesner (1996) found large-scale entries, especially in differentiated 
industries, tend to survive longer, but found no evidence that resource fit leads to business 
turnover. Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung (1997) examined how foreign firms operating in a host 
  15country generate information spillovers that may improve late entrants’ performance, as 
measured by subsidiary survival. They demonstrated that subsequent foreign entrants learned 
from earlier entrants’ success/failure. Shaver (1998) explored how a subsidiary’s 
performance, again measured by survival, might be related to the entry mode choice. He 
found no systematic differences between subsidiaries established by greenfield investment 
and those by acquisition, after controlling for endogeneity. 
  It is incorrect, however, to attribute subsidiary survival/exit only to subsidiary 
performance. First, some foreign entries, especially joint ventures, are in effect real options. 
Kogut (1991) argued that firms seeking to enter foreign markets might initiate joint ventures 
to learn about local markets and tap local resources. Depending on the performance of their 
initial entry experience, firms can decide to “exercise a call or put option” by scaling up or 
exiting the business. Small investments might also be similar to a real option. Given 
uncertainty in foreign market environments, firms may initiate a small entry as a test. Thus, 
we need to be careful in interpreting survival/exit from joint ventures and small operations as 
an indicator for subsidiary performance. Second, some exits may reflect sound strategic 
decisions but not indicate poor performance. For instance, a firm that has run a low-cost 
manufacturing operation might divest its foreign operations in a country where labor costs 
have increased sharply and then relocate. Thus, we need to control for country-level operating 
environmental factors, such as market attractiveness, labor costs, and currency appreciation, 
which might lead to exits. 
Parent firms’ international expansion strategy and controls 
We focused primarily on parent firms’ internationalization strategies. We measured 
parent firms’ pace of international expansion as Speed, measured as the average number of 
foreign manufacturing subsidiaries divided by the number of years since the firm’s first 
foreign expansion (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). For instance, a firm that first invested in 
  161990 and made a total of 10 investments by 1995 will have a Speed score of 2.0. This measure 
is a time-varying construct, constantly updated at each time t to reflect the total number of 
foreign subsidiaries starting from the year of its initial investment. In other words, if the speed 
of a firm’s internationalization strategy is high, the parent firm initiated many foreign direct 
investments in a short time.  
We used three measures for competitive risks as moderator variables between the 
speed of international expansion and a firm’s international performance. We measured the 
industry-level competitive risks that stem from globalization with Industry Globalization by 
adopting indices developed by Kobrin (1991), based on intra-firm resource flows.  Kobrin 
defined the index of global integration as the ratio of affiliate sales to foreign affiliates, plus 
affiliate sales to parents, plus parent exports to affiliates, to all foreign affiliate sales plus 
parent exports for majority-owned non-bank affiliates of non-bank parents (1991:21). We 
adopted Kobrin’s index based upon the 1989 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad at the 3-digit SIC level.
3 This measure reflects the requirements for rapid global 
integration at the industry level. For instance, the electronics industry globalized earlier and 
more fully than other industries did. Several subfields of electronics, including radio, 
televisions, computers, communications equipment, and electronics components (which 
includes semiconductors) are characterized by high R&D intensity and economies of scale.  
For these reasons, many subfields within electronics ranked as the most globalized among the 
56 manufacturing 3-digit subfields studied by Kobrin.  
Second, we measured the competitive risks that stem from competition with domestic 
rivals with the Lead-time of Home Country Rivals, defined as the difference between the 
calendar year when a focal firm made its first direct foreign investment and the year when the 
focal firm’s rivals in the same industry, defined by the 2-digit Korean SIC industry, made 
                                                 
3. These were based on data from U.S. firms, but are assumed to be a valid measure to capture industry 
  17their first foreign direct investments. For instance, if a firm first invested in 1992 and its 
domestic rival first invested in 1988, the lead-time is 4 years. When a focal firm was the first 
to make a foreign direct investment in another country, the lead-time of its home-country 
rivals is zero. 
 Third, we measured the competitive risks with other foreign multinationals in each 
host country with the Foreign Rivals in Host Countries, defined as the incoming foreign 
direct investments deflated by the GDP at time t. Since a firm might have made multiple 
entries until time t, we calculated the averages of incoming foreign direct investments over 
GDP in all host countries until time t. 
We used several indicators to operationalize a firm's resources that were necessary for 
helping a new foreign subsidiary to survive. We measured R&D and Advertising Intensities of 
parent firms, defined as R&D and advertising expenditures divided by sales, at time t. These 
variables measured the availability of intangible technological and marketing resources that 
foreign subsidiaries could use. We expect that as parents possess more intangible resources, it 
is more likely their foreign subsidiaries will survive. We also measured parent firms’ financial 
resources with Debt/Assets as firms with less debt may have enough financial resources to 
support their foreign operations. We measured Firm Size by total firm assets (in thousands 
Korean won) at time t, which we log-transformed to control for any firm size factors. Firm 
Age is the number of calendar years since a firm was established to control for age and 
experience. Many of the firms in our sample were affiliated with large business groups, 
known as chaebols (Chang, 2003). The Korean government annually identifies the 30 largest 
business groups according to asset size in the non-financial sectors and publishes a listing of 
their affiliates under the “Act for Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Promotion (known as 
the Fair Trade Act)” in order to block anti-competitive behavior. We identified group 
                                                                                                                                                          
globalization. 
  18membership by a dummy variable, Business Group Affiliation, which is 1 if a firm is affiliated 
with a top 30 group and 0 otherwise. A group affiliate’s foreign subsidiary may benefit from 
other group affiliates’ operations in the same country and is expected to be more likely to 
low equity share may be similar to real 






  We controlled for two subsidiary factors that may affect subsidiaries’ survival. 
Investment Size reflects the size of investments in a foreign subsidiary by a parent in constant 
US dollars (in millions), which we log-transformed. Ownership Share is the share of equity 
ownership in a foreign establishment. We argue that the larger the investment and the greater 
the ownership share is, the less likely the parent is to withdraw. Conversely, small investments 
and investments in which the parent firm has a 
options, from whic
y controls 
 We included several control variables that may affect a foreign subsidiary’s survival. 
We expected firms would stay in large markets, so we measured the Growth Domestic 
Product (GDP) of each country at time t (in billions), as collected in the World Development 
Indicators, which is compiled by the World Bank. We collected the hourly Wages in the 
manufacturing sector (in US dollars) at time t to reflect the relative attractiveness of a country 
as a manufacturing base from the Yearbook of Labor Statistics, published by the International 
Labor Organization. Comparing hourly wages across countries is not easy because official 
statistics vary greatly from country to country. When hourly wages were not available, we 
converted monthly or weekly wages by assuming a 40-hour week. When wages in US dolla
                                                 
4  We also explored whether a firm’s prior experience in exporting mitigated the hazards of rapid 
internationalization.  A firm’s export data are available for only a limited number of listed companies. For this 
reduced sample, the interaction term between speed and export was not significant.  The results are available 
upon request. 
  19were n
n direct investments 
deflate
flect the 
ial Crisis to control for whether there were more exits during the crisis. 
                                                
ot available, we converted local wages by dividing them by official exchange rates.
5 
Currency Depreciation was measured by the yearly change of the official exchange 
rate at time t. As the host country local currency depreciates, its price competitiveness in 
terms of US dollars improves, thus increasing the likelihood of survival. The Political Hazard 
of the respective country at time t where a foreign subsidiary is located was measured by 
Henisz’s (2000) political hazard variable. Henisz (2000) developed a political hazard measure 
that relies on a simple spatial model of political interaction to derive the extent to which any 
political actor or the replacement for that actor (e.g., the executive or a chamber of the 
legislature) is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. This measure also accounts 
for the extent of alignment across branches of government and the extent of preference 
heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Thus, his measure of political constraints ranges 
from zero (most hazardous) to one (most constrained). We measured the political hazards as 
one minus the original political constraints index by Henisz (2000) to reflect the possibility 
that the fewer policy constraints a country has, the more political hazards a foreign firm might 
encounter upon entry.
6 We measure the competitive risks with foreign multinationals in each 
host country with the Incoming FDI/GDP, defined as the incoming foreig
d by the GDP at time t, specific to each subsidiary in that country. 
In addition, we included 15 industry dummy variables based on the Korean 2-digit 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) to control for any industry factors that might have led 
to subsidiary survival/exit. We also added a time period dummy for 1997-2000 to re
Asian Financ
Hypotheses 
  As we discussed earlier, we used exits from foreign subsidiaries as an indicator of 
 
s, but 
5 We also measured the per-capita income at time t to reflect the existence of wealthy potential customer
this variable is highly correlated with the wage variable. To avoid multicollinearity, we thus did not use it. 
6 We employed country risk, compiled by Euromoney, as an alternative measure of risk. The results when we 
  20firms’ international performance. A high level of exits from incumbent foreign subsidiaries 
may denote poor international performance by individual firms. We therefore translated 
proposition 1 into hypothesis 1, which states that the speed of international expansion will 
lead to f
ypothesis 1:   The speed of international expansion will be positively related to 
 
eed and exits from 
foreign
ypothesis 2:    Industry globalization will negatively moderate the relationship 
   The lead-time of home-country rivals will positively moderate the 
lationship between the speed of international expansion and exits from foreign 
:    Foreign rivals in host countries will positively moderate the 
lationship between the speed of international expansion and exits from foreign 
subsidiaries  
 




 more exits from  oreign subsidiaries.   
H
exits from foreign subsidiaries.  
The following hypotheses explore three kinds of moderators that will affect the 
proposed relationship between the speed of international expansions and exits from foreign 
subsidiaries, as specified in hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 explores the influence of an industry’s 
global competitive pressures on the relationship between internationalization speed and 
subsidiary exits. Hypotheses 3 and 4 explore the home and host countries’ competitive 
environments regarding the relationship between internationalization sp
 subsidiaries. Figure 2 summarizes the hypothesized relationships. 
H










Because we are exploring the relationship between speed of international expansion 
and firms’ international performance as measured by subsidiaries’ survival/exits while taking 
various competitive risk factors as moderators, we employed two separate analyses at the 
                                                                                                                                                          
used this variable are consistent with those for political hazards. 
  21individual firm and subsidiary levels, respectively. The firm-level analysis explores whether 
rapid international expansion strategy results in poor firm-level international performance, 
measured by the count of exits out of existing foreign subsidiaries, at each time t. If a firm 
divests many subsidiaries, its doing so may reflect the firm’s poor international performance. 
While the firm-level analysis reveals the overall international performance at the firm level, it 
does not show which individual subsidiaries a firm exited from. Therefore, we conducted 
another analysis at the subsidiary level, in which we explored what subsidiaries were exited 
and how soon they were exited, and examined how important the effects of parent firms’ rapid 
international expansion strategy are on the hazards of individual subsidiaries’ exits, after 
contro
nal expansion strategy and other firm level control variables. Thus, if 
Yi ,t+1  λi,t = E(Yi, t+1) would equal 
 
                                                
lling for firm-level resources, subsidiary factors, and various host-country contingent 
factors that may also affect the subsidiary exit.   
At the firm level, we used the exit count at time t (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3….), as a dependent 
variable and use the Poisson regression model (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).
7 Let the exit 
count of a firm i at time t+1, Yi,t+1, and Xi,t denote a vector of firm-level explanatory variables 
such as firms’ internatio
follows a Poisson distribution, the mean exit count for firm i, 
the variance V(Yi, t+1).  
λit = E(Yi ,t+1) = V(Yi, t+1) = exp[Xi,tβ]    
Our data set for the firm-level analysis consists of firm-years, starting from one year after the 
first foreign direct investment, to either 2003, the end of our observation period, or the year 
when the focal firm exited from its foreign direct investments and no longer had any foreign 
subsidiary.  Among the 891 firms that made any foreign direct investment from 1970 to 1996, 
173 firms lacked the financial information or exact industry classification necessary for us to 
match them with the 3-digit US SIC to calculate the globalization index. The remaining 718 
 
7 Alternatively, we can use the negative binomial regression model, a variant of the former that can account for 
  22firms generated a total 6,705 firm-year observations.  Given the panel data, we employed the 
ndom
ry exit event should have taken place, conditional upon 
 subsidiaries at risk.  This formulation leads to the following specification of 
e likel ood fo the ith ubsidia
 L (t)=h (t)exp(µ X(t))/h (t)[Σ exp(µ X(t))], 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ra  effects Poisson regression technique to control unobserved firm heterogeneity with 
random effects (Hausman and McFadden, 1984).
8  
  To analyze exits of individual subsidiaries at the subsidiary level, we used Cox’s 
proportional hazard model (Cox and Oakes 1984, Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980). The 
dependent variable in the hazard model is a hazard rate that denotes the likelihood a 
subsidiary is exited at each time period. This model presumes hazard rates of individual 
subsidiaries can be represented as log-linear functions of the various firm-level and 
subsidiary-level covariates.  If h(t; X(t)) is the hazard function for an individual subsidiaries 
with time-varying covariates X(t), the proportional hazard models specifies this hazard as the 
likelihood that the observed subsidia
the hazards of all
th ih r   s ry: 
  
i o t o t
             jeRt 
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t; j is an index for subsidiaries at risk at time t 
(Rt  being the risk set); Xi(t) is the time varying covariates for subsidiary i; and µ is 
coefficients to be estimated. With this formulation, the model calculates the ratio of the 
hazards as the conditional probability of a subsidiary exit given all other subsidiaries in the 
same risk set. This model implicitly assumes a multiplicative relationship between the 
underlying hazard rates and the log-linear function of the covariates (the proportionality 
assumption). It also assumes that the effect of the covariates upon the hazard function is log-
linear. These two assumptions enable the model to leave the baseline hazard unspecified.  
 
heteroscedasticity. There seems to be no need to control for this heterogeneity in our data set.  
8 The fixed effects model, an alternative way of handling panel data, requires at least one observation for firm i 
to be non-zero (Green, 2003, p. 747), which means firms that did not record any exit during the study time 
  23Since the proportional hazard model does not specify the baseline hazard, there is no bias 
incurred by misspecifying the stochastic process of the underlying hazard rate. This generality 
zard rate is the same for all firms in the 
sk set. From this assumption, ho(t) cancels out.  We can rewrite the likelihood function as: 
  L (t)=exp(µ X(t))/[ Σ exp(µ X(t))]. 
 
 can interpret the t-values as asymptotically close to 
riables are time varying, except for industry globalization, 
tecomer, and two subsidiary controls for investment size and ownership, 
                                      
is achieved by assuming further that the baseline ha
ri
i t t
           jeRt  
The rewritten likelihood function is equivalent to allowing only the conditional probabilities 
to contribute to the statistical inferences.  Multiplying these probabilities together for each of 
the distinct time spells gives the partial likelihood function to be maximized. No information 
on the precise time of entry is required, providing a partial, rather than full, maximum 
likelihood estimate. Thus, partial likelihood estimation involves an efficiency loss because the 
exact investment time is not considered. Nevertheless, the estimates are consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed. We
the full maximum likelihood estimates. (For more detailed information on the assumptions of 
the model, see Cox and Oakes (1984).) 
  There is no left-censoring problem since we included all foreign direct investments 
made by Korean firms from 1970 onward. Right censoring, caused by truncating the 
observation period at 2003, is handled by conventional adjustments. Censored observations 
enter the risk set at each time period under observation, but do not contribute to the numerator 
of the likelihood function. Among 1,459 foreign direct investments, we lost 326 investments 
because we lacked key indicators of parent firms’ financial information, industry codes, or 
country level indicators, resulting in 1,033 foreign subsidiaries. 400 out of 1,033 foreign 
subsidiaries were exited by 2003, resulting in 7,349 distinct time spells (i.e., one year). By 
design, all our explanatory va
home-country la
                                                                                                                  
  24
 
period would be excluded. We therefore use the random effects model in this study. which do not vary over time.   
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and Table 2 shows results from the random 
effects Poisson regression models in which the dependent variable is the exit count at time t+1 
at the individual firm level. Model (1) in Table 2 shows a baseline model in which we include 
only firm-level control variables. Model (2) includes firms’ internationalization speed variable 
and three contextual variables, industry globalization, lead-time of home country rivals, and 
foreign rivals in host countries. Models (3)-(5) explore interaction effects between 
internationalization speed and the three contextual variables. The chi-squared statistics show 
good model fits.  
------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------ 
Model (2) tests hypothesis 1. International expansion speed is positively significant 
for exit count at time t at the individual firm level, showing there are more exits from foreign 
subsidiaries of firms that pursued rapid internationalization. The result suggests potential 
hazards associated with rapid internationalization. The size of coefficient implies, for 
instance, that a firm with twice the speed of another firm is expected to have 1.43(=e
0.36) times 
more exits out of the same number of foreign subsidiaries.  This confirms hypothesis 1. 
Model (3) includes the interaction between speed and industry globalization. The 
interaction term is negatively significant, corresponding to hypothesis 2. The main effect of 
speed remains positively significant. This result suggests that while rapid international 
expansion may cause a high rate of subsidiary failures, it can be justified in industries that are 
characterized by high level of global integration. The coefficient of the interaction term, -
2.16, is much bigger than the direct effect of speed (0.88) is, which indicates the positive 
impact of speed on the subsidiary exit might be neutralized or even negated in industries that 
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here 
 
  25have a h
orable strategy for firms that 
quickly 
ountries variable, is negative when speed is low, but become positive when speed is 
high. 
igh level of global integration. 
Likewise, model (4) explores the interaction between speed and the lead-time of 
home-country rivals. The interaction term is positively significant, suggesting firms that 
internationalized late relative to their domestic rivals have higher rates of subsidiary failure 
than do firms that responded quickly to domestic rivals’ internationalization, confirming 
hypothesis 3. The direct effect of speed becomes insignificant when it is introduced with the 
interaction term. While the direct effect of the lead-time of the home-country rival variable is 
negative, if firms in the same industry all internationalize rapidly, the combined effects of 
direct and interaction effects could be positive when international expansion is rapid. The 
results suggest that rapid international expansion is a more fav
respond to domestic rivals’ internationalization moves.  
Model (5) explores the interaction effects between speed and foreign rivals in host 
countries. The interaction term is positively significant at the 10% level. This result means 
rapid international expansion is detrimental when it is directed to markets with a high level of 
overall incoming foreign direct investments. Conversely, rapid international expansion is 
more effective when it is directed to markets where there is a low level of incoming foreign 
direct investments, such as emerging markets. Again, the direct effect of speed is insignificant 
and the direct effect of foreign rivals in host countries is negatively significant.  The 
combined effects of direct and interaction effects, when holding constant the foreign rivals in 
host c
Among other firm-level control variables, firm size and R&D intensities are 
positively significant for exits, and firm age is negatively significant for exits only in model 
(1) when no firms’ internationalization strategy variables are included. They are insignificant 
in the rest of the models.  Business group membership variable is positively significant in all 




t benefit from learning from prior entry experiences. This result 
confirm
its than non-group affiliates do. 
Table 4 shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard models of exits from 
individual subsidiaries, and table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. Compared to the firm-
level analysis, which shows only the magnitudes of subsidiary exits by counting their cases at 
time t, this subsidiary-level hazard modeling of exit decisions indicates how various factors 
such as parent firms’ overall internationalization strategies, parent firms’ resources, subsidiary 
factors and host country factors jointly determine the exit decisions of each individual 
subsidiary. Subsidiary-level modeling thus lets us observe the impact of a parent firm’s 
international strategy on the performance of an individual subsidiary, after contro
m, subsidiary and host country factors that may also affect the exit decision. 
Model (1) in Table 4 shows a baseline model without any hypothesized variables. 
Model (2) includes only direct effects, and models (3)-(5) include interaction terms 
separately, analogous to our models in Table 2. The sign and significance levels of models in 
Table 4 are consistent with those of the models in Table 2. The direct effects of parent firms’ 
internationalization speed positively affects the exit of their individual subsidiaries, which 
means that subsidiaries of firms that internationalized rapidly are more likely to exit, probably 
because they could no
s hypothesis 1. 
The interaction term between speed and industry globalization is negatively 
significant, corresponding to hypothesis 2, suggesting that the potential hazard of rapid 
internationalization strategy might be mitigated in industries that have a high level of global 
integration. The interaction terms between speed and the lead-time of home-country rivals 
and foreign rivals in host countries variables are positively significant, consistent with 
hypotheses 3 and 4, indicating that a rapid internationalization strategy can be more effective 
  27when it is pursued by firms with less lead-time of their home-country rivals, and when it is 
targeted
epreciation, political hazards, and the degree of incoming FDI 
over GDP are insignificant. 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 around here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
ts left for latecomers 
like us t
onalize late. To them, their businesses 
 for markets not tapped by other foreign multinationals, such as emerging markets. 
Among firm-level control variables, business group membership variable is weakly 
and positively significant in models (1) and (2), but is insignificant in the other models.   
Subsidiaries in which the parent has large investments and/or a large equity share have lower 
exit rates (higher survival rates), reflecting high commitment. These variables control for real 
option investments, for which exit might not indicate poor performance. We also found 
Korean firms are more likely to exit a subsidiary in a country that has high labor costs. The 




Kim Woo-Joong, the ex-chairman of the Daewoo Group, once commented, “Many of 
my businesses feel great pressure to globalize instantly. For instance, in the automobile 
industry, people say only the top 10 or top 6 can survive.  If we do not reach a global scale 
fast enough, we will go bankrupt eventually. I would rather go bankrupt after trying a global 
game rather than wait and sit for a slow bankruptcy…… It was a blessing for us that many 
countries were under Communist control until very recently, although that might sound bad to 
the people who suffered there. Otherwise, there would have no marke
o enter. That is the reason why we focus on emerging markets.” 
The incremental internationalization theory has long been conventional wisdom in 
international business research. The theory is intuitively appealing and simple. Yet it may 
sound like a luxury to managers of firms that internati




hat pursue internationalization relatively late, such as those from emerging 
market 
ot survive unless they go global immediately.   
This study attempts to narrow the gap between theory and reality. It addresses the 
boundary conditions of this theory and proposes some alternative approaches. The 
incremental internationalization theory has several important assumptions that may limit its 
ability to explain the internationalization of late movers such as enterprises in emerging 
markets. For instance, it emphasizes learning by doing and does not allow for the possibility 
that firms might be able to acquire some codified knowledge by studying laws and regulations 
ost country and rely on tacit knowledge by hiring talented and experienced managers.  
In addition, this theory focuses only on reducing market uncertainty and neglects 
competitive risks, which can pose great hazards to firms that internationalize incrementally. 
Our study indicates that incremental internationalization may be more applicable when firms 
internationalize early or when they have advantages strong enough to offset any competitive 
risks that stem from expanding incrementally. This theory may have less to say, howev
rms that face great pressure to globalize or want to have an early-mover advantage. 
We also propose an alternative approach to incremental internationalization, namely 
the rapid internationalization strategy. This study is, to our knowledge, the first large-scale 
empirical work that explores this alternative. We found that rapid internationalization can be 
hazardous, as incremental internationalization theory correctly notes, but it may be a good 
strategy for firms t
countries. 
As does the incremental approach, rapid internationalization strategy has boundary 
conditions. First, it may be more appropriate if a firm’s industry is globalizing very rapidly 
and the firm is fighting against time (Kobrin, 1991). In such industries, the competitive risks 
of incrementalism may outweigh any gains from reduced market uncertainties. Thus, industry 
globalization clearly enhances the efficacy of rapid internationalization strategy. Second, first 
  29(or early) mover advantages may also make this strategy more appropriate. Rapid 
internationalization can be more effectively pursued by firms that are early movers or that 
respond quickly to domestic rivals’ internationalization. A rapid international expansion 




ontrol variables, such 
as mark
emerging market countries. 
Further, a rapid internationalization strategy may be more useful for firms that have 
greater absorptive capacity and can tap knowledge outside their own experience. Rapid 
internationalization necessarily incurs time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989), which can be reduced for firms with great absorptive capacity. A firm that facilitates 
sharing of knowledge or know-how can determine such capacity. Firms can also tap external 
sources of knowledge via hiring talented and experienced professional managers
nts, thereby compressing internationalization without incurring additional risk.  
This study has several limitations. First, it focused on the speed of international 
expansion. More elaborate measures of non-incremental internationalization may warrant 
future study. Second, this study could not consider management styles and processes, which 
might have affected the speed of internationalization, as well as how firms handled the higher 
risks associated with non-incremental strategies. The effective management of risks and 
speedy expansion also merits further study. Third, future studies should expand the scope of 
the sample by including not only firms from developing companies but also firms from 
developed countries, such as “born global” firms, which began internationalizing only 
recently. Fourth, future studies should develop additional host-country c
et concentration, that may affect foreign entrants’ performance. 
This study indicates that rapid international expansion can be a valuable strategic 
alternative for firms that internationalize late, especially firms from emerging markets. Yet it 
suggests firms should execute this strategy carefully in order to avoid excessive risk, which 
  30may negatively affect their international performance. An important practical implication for 
emerging market enterprises is that rapid internationalization is a “must” in globalized 
industries. By moving quickly, firms can reduce the hazard of failure and improve their 
international performance in such industries. Firms from emerging markets also should 
quickly catch up with their domestic rivals in internationalization. They should also choose to 
pursue this strategy in other emerging markets rather than in well-established markets in 
developed countries. Moreover, managers should balance between market uncertainty and 
competitive risks when they determine how quickly to expand internationally, when to start, 
and where to enter. 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized relationship 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for firm-level exit count models 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
(1) Exit count  0.06 0.30 0  7
(2) Speed   0.36 0.36 0.03  4
(3) Industry globalization  0.23 0.11 0.08  0.47
(4) Lead-time of home country rivals  11.63 8.69 0  26
(5) Foreign rivals in host countries   0.03 0.04 -0.10  0.93
(6) Accumulated entry count  1.68 2.48 1  46
(7) Firm size   17.69 2.00 10.35  24.02
(8) R&D intensity  0.002 0.01 0  0.14
(9) Advertising intensity  0.004 0.01 0  0.21
(10) Firm age   22.68 12.2 0  87
(11) Debt/asset  0.78 0.41 0.05  5.48
(12) Business group membership  0.15 0.36 0  1




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12)
( 1 )   1 . 0 0                
(2)  0.20    1.00              
(3)  0.03    0.10    1.00             
(4)  -0.07    -0.16    -0.03    1.00          
(5)  -0.03    -0.01    0.00    0.09  1.00         
(6)  0.40    0.41    0.11    -0.10  -0.02  1.00        
(7)  0.12    0.13    0.14    -0.19  0.02  0.37  1.00       
(8)  0.14   0.22   0.21   -0.21  -0.01  0.24  0.22  1.00         
(9)  0.03    0.12    0.00    -0.17 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.19 1.00         
(10)  0.02   -0.07   -0.01   -0.05  0.01  0.16  0.53  0.01  0.06   1.00      
(11)  -0.01   -0.04   -0.08   0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05  0.01   0.00   1.00 
(12)  0.12   0.17   0.10   -0.13  -0.02  0.29  0.59  0.18  0.06   0.24   0.08  1.00Table 2 Random effects Poisson regression models of exit counts (t+1) from foreign direct investments at the 
firm level 
 
       Models  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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  -2  Log-likelihood  -1547.18 -1486.04 -1483.64 -1483.50 -1484.35 










  No of obs (no of firms)  6,705 (718)  6,705 (718)  6,705 (718)  6,705 (718)  6,705 (718) 
Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †: p<0.10. 15 industry dummies and the Financial Crisis 
(1997-2000) time period dummy are not shown. 
  39Table 3 Descriptive statistics for Cox hazard model of subsidiary exits at the subsidiary level 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  .       Min  Max 
(1) Speed   0.62  0.65  0.04   4.00 
(2) Industry globalization  0.25  0.11  0.08   0.47 
(3) Lead-time of home country rivals  10.38  8.30  0.00   26.00 
(4) Foreign rivals in host countries   0.03  0.02  -0.10   0.10 
(5) Accumulated entry count  4.83  8.86  1   46 
(6) Firm size   18.63  2.40  10.35   24.02 
(7) R&D intensity  0.01  0.01  0.00   0.14 
(8) Advertising intensity  0.01  0.01  0.00   0.21 
(9) Firm age  24.60  11.55  0.00   80.00 
(10) Debt/assets  0.75  0.37  0.05   5.48 
(11) Business group membership  0.28  0.45  0   1
(12) Investment size  7.85 1.56  0.24   13.42 
(13) Ownership  0.82  0.26  0.10   1 
(14) GDP  1.51  2.49  0.00   10.95 
(15) Wage  3.43  7.11  0.00   57.92 
(16) Currency depreciation  0.09  0.48  -0.14   18.40 
(17) Political Risks  0.80  0.24  0.28   1.00 
(18) Incoming FDI/GDP  0.04  0.08  -0.12   0.94 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) (18)
( 1 )   1 . 0 0                      
(2)  0.23    1.00                    
(3)  -0.19    -0.10    1.00                   
(4)  -0.08    -0.07    0.24    1.00                  
(5)  0.75    0.26    -0.18    -0.12    1.00                 
(6)  0.49   0.28   -0.26   -0.06   0.62   1.00                          
(7)  0.59   0.27   -0.24   -0.10   0.59   0.43   1.00                       
(8)  0.27   0.06   -0.18   -0.03   0.18   0.19   0.30  1.00                     
(9)  0.08   0.02   -0.07   -0.05   0.23   0.55   0.03  0.07  1.00                   
(10)  -0.03   -0.06   0.06   0.05   -0.04   -0.02   -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  1.00                 
(11)  0.45   0.21   -0.19   -0.06   0.51   0.71   0.37  0.13  0.33  0.09  1.00               
(12)  0.18   0.13   -0.13   -0.03   0.26   0.43   0.17  0.04  0.23  -0.03  0.25  1.00             
(13)  -0.05   -0.04   0.13   0.02   -0.07   -0.22   -0.06  -0.01  -0.19  0.02  -0.22  0.10  1.00           
(14)  -0.01   0.07   -0.03   -0.19   0.04   0.09   0.05  0.03  0.02  -0.06  0.05  0.06  -0.01  1.00          
(15)  0.11   0.12   -0.12   -0.28   0.08   0.14   0.14  0.11  -0.01  -0.04  0.13  0.11  0.03  0.73   1.00        
(16)  0.08   0.01   -0.05   -0.04   0.09   0.06   0.08  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.08   -0.07   1.00      
(17)  -0.10   -0.07   0.13   0.23   -0.11   -0.16   -0.13  -0.04  -0.10  0.10  -0.14  -0.03  0.10  -0.26   -0.36   0.01   1.00   
(18)  -0.04   -0.04   0.04   0.19   -0.01   0.03   -0.04  -0.03  0.03  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.02  -0.13   -0.13   -0.03   -0.13  1.00 
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Table 4 Cox proportional hazard models of exit from individual subsidiaries 
     Models  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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 Log  pseudo-likelihood  -2537.17  -2529.09 -2527.54 -2525.69 -2527.29 










  No of obs  
(no of subsidiaries) 
7349 (1033)  7349 (1033)  7349 (1033)  7349 (1033)  7349 (1033) 
Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †: p<0.10. 15 industry dummies and the Financial Crisis (1997-
2000) time period dummy are not shown.  We calculated heteroscadasticity-consistent errors are shown with 
the same firms with cluster options. 